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Complete List of All Parties to the Proceeding in the Court:
(1) PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation
n/k/a PIONEER BUILDERS COMPANY, INC., a Utah domesticated corporation.
(2) K DA CORPORATION, a Utah corporation.
There are a number of additional parties who were parties to earlier proceedings and appeals
in this case. None of those parties have been involved in the proceedings subsequent to the
foreclosure sale or this appeal.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103.

ISSUES AND ST AND ARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant asserts the following four issues on appeal:
Issue #1: The court erred in determining that K D A had waived its statutory

right of redemption by entering into the Settlement Agreement.
a. Determinative law: Utah R. Civ. P. 69C.
b. Preservation of issue: The determination of KDA's right of redemption

under the Settlement Agreement was a central issue in its Motion to
Enforce Redemption Right and Pioneer's Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement. (E.g., R. 7014, R. 7032, and R. 7396)
c. Standard of review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of law

that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.

Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20 Pl 4, 133 P.3d 428.
Issue #2: The court erred in determining that it should not consider parol

evidence from the contract formation communications to clarify the Settlement
Agreement between the parties.
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a. Preservation of issue: The issue of parol evidence was a primary issue in
the briefing of the parties. K D A discussed this matter in its Response to
Pioneer's Objection to Evidence. (R. 7404, 7405)

b. Determinative law: Utah R. Evid. 408(a); Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,
190 P.3d 1269; Ward v. lntermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah
1995); Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600.

c. Standard of review: The legal application of the parol evidence rule is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the
district court. Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269.

Issue #3: The court erred in determining that Utah permits contractual
modification of statutory redemption rights.

a. Preservation of issue: Appeal of final order determining this central issue.
K DA discussed this matter during the hearing on its Motion (R. 7626).
Further the Court made a specific ruling on this matter in the Amended
Judgment and Order finding that a Redemption Right can be waived in
Utah. (R. 7568-7569)

b. Determinative law: Utah R. Evid. Rule 69C.
c. Standard of review: Statutory construction and deference is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the district
court.
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Issue #4: Which pa11y is the prevailing party upon the finalization of this
appeal. The Appellant claims that it should be awarded attorneys fees and costs in this
matter and Appellee's award of attorney's fees and costs should be vacated.
~

a. Preservation of issue: Appeal of final order determining this central issue.
This matter was discussed in the briefing between both parties. K DA
specifically requested its attorney fees and damages in its Memorandum
Opposing Pioneer's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. (R. 7309)
b. Law: The parties agree that the Settlement Agreement provides for

attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. Appellee has been awarded
attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party in the lower court. Both
parties claim attorney's fees and costs incurred for this appeal.
c. Standard of review: The legal determination on this issue is simply the
determination of which party is the prevailing party based upon the terms of
the Settlement Agreement. Neither party contests that attorneys' fees and
costs are payable to the prevailing party as per the Settlement Agreement.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 69C of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 408(a) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence are determinative and/or of central importance to this appeal:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69C. Redemption of real property after sale.
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate
is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which case the sale is
absolute.
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(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be
redeemed by the defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property junior
to that on which the property was sold or by their successors in interest. If the
defendant redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and the defendant is
restored to the defendant's estate. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any
other creditor having a right of redemption may redeem.
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required
to the purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser:
(c)(l) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the
redemptioner claims the right to redeem;
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish
the claim; and
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien.
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days
after the sale.
(e) Redemption price. The price to redeem is the sale price plus six
percent. The price for a subsequent redemption is the redemption price plus
three percent. If the purchaser or redemptioner Jiles with the county recorder
notice of the amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance, maintenance,
repair or any lien other than the lien on which the redemption was based, the
price to redeem includes such amounts plus six percent for an initial
redemption or three percent for a subsequent redemption. Failure to file notice
of the amounts with the county recorder waives the right to claim such
amounts.
( t) Dispute regarding price. If there is a dispute about the redemption
price, the redemptioner shall within 21 days of the redemption pay into court
the amount necessary for redemption less the amount in dispute and file and
serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the items to which the
redemptioner objects and the grounds for the objection. The petition is deemed
denied. The court may permit discovery. The court shall conduct an evidentiary
hearing and enter an order determining the redemption price. The redemptioner
shall pay to the clerk any additional amount within seven days after the court's
order.
(g) Certificate of redemption. The purchaser shall promptly execute and
deliver to the redemptioner, or the redemptioner to a subsequent redemptioner,
a certificate of redemption containing:
(g)( 1) a detailed description of the real property;
(g)(2) the price paid;
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(g)(3) a statement that all right, title, interest of the purchaser in the
property is conveyed to the redemptioner; and
(g)( 4) if known, whether the sale is subject to redemption.
The redemptioner or subsequent redemptioner shall file a duplicate of the
certificate with the county recorder.
(h) Conveyance. The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to
conveyance upon the expiration of the time pennitted for redemption.
[Subsections (i)(j)(k) of Rule 69C are omitted.]
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408.

Compromise Offers and Negotiations

(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible either to
prove or disprove liability for or the validity or amount of a disputed claim:
(1) furnishing, promising, or offering - or accepting, promising to
accept, or offering to accept - a valuable consideration in order to
compromise or attempt to compromise the claim; and

(2) conduct or a statement made in compromise negotiations.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as

proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay,
or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
(2) The court is not required to exclude evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations.

0b
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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court entered its Order and Judgment Granting Summary Judgment
and Foreclosure for Plaintiff (Pioneer) prepared by Pioneer directing the Bear Lake
Property be foreclosed "subject to exercise of rights of redemption" as set forth in
Utah R. Civ. P. 69C. A copy of the Judgment, Order and Judgment Granting

Summary Judgment and Foreclosure/or Plaintiff(the "Order"}, entered September
04, 2015 (R. 6458-6476). The Order also ordered a foreclosure sale by the Sheriff
with the purchaser at the sale to be subject to "proper exercise of any applicable rights
of redemption." Order at page 11 ifl3 (R. 6468). The Order further commands that
"After the time allowed by law for redemption" the Sheriff is directed to then issue a
Sheriffs Deed at which time the grantee named therein shall have "ownership" of the
Property. Order at page 121 13 (R. 6469).
The Sheriffs Sale was held at the Rich County District Courthouse, in
Randolph, Utah. Pioneer was the only bidder present and made the opening bid of
$200,000. That bid was accepted as the winning bid for the Property. There were no
objections at the Sheriffs sale. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale states that "this sale is
subject to redemption as provided by law." (R. 6654).
Within the time allowed, K D A, as a subordinate creditor in the Property,
served Pioneer with its Exercise of Redemption Right (R 6641-6642) and a Cashier's
Check in the amount of $212,000 (R 6657) with a request that Pioneer execute and
return, forthwith, the included Certificate of Redemption. Pioneer refused. The matter
was taken to the court for detennination.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
12may contain errors.
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After full submission of the motions and argument, the trial court found that
there was such a waiver by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The trial court in
making its ruling declined to consider relevant parol evidence consisting of contract
~

drafts and c01Tespondence prior to the Settlement Agreement. Theses documents
showed the final Settlement Agreement was the result of modifications made by
Pioneer and because of K D A's insistence that the proposed Settlement Agreement
be modified so that K D A would retain its redemption rights. See Addenda #2 and its
Exhibits #1-#3 included as Addenda #3 (R. 7249-7304), #3 (R. 7245-7248) and #5 (R.
7044-7117). The modification agreed to between the parties eliminated contractual
language that K D A would (I) release its trust deed, and (2) would execute and
record a release of this second T~st Deed against the Property. K DA insisted on
these changes by Pioneer for the stated purpose of retaining K D A's redemption
rights as to the future foreclosure sale. See Addendum #4 ,r,r 2-3 (R. 7245-7248).
K D A's appeal is that the trial court erred in its interpretation that the final
Settlement Agreement, as written, contains a waiver or release of K D A's redemption

(;j

rights. K DA also argues that the trial court's error is made additionally clear by the
relevant parol evidence contained in the correspondence and modifications agreed to
by Pioneer which the trial court declined to consider. K D A's appeal is that the trial
court erred in not considering that evidence. Lastly, K DA argues a waiver of
redemption rights is against Utah law and policy and should not be permitted. If such
waivers are allowed then they should be considered as subject to strict scrutiny that
such a waiver was intended and knowingly agreed to.

~
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts in this matter are not in dispute. The issue was presented and
resolved by the trial court in response to the motions and arguments of counsel. To
assist the court in its understanding of the case the material and relevant facts are
presented.
1.

Facts as to the Settlement Agreement between Pioneer and K D A. The

following Facts were presented in Pioneer's Response to Motion to Enforce Redemption
Right as Facts.filed July 11, 2016. K DA in its Reply accepted these Facts as per Rule
7(d)(a)(C), URCP.

(a) Pioneer and K D A entered into a Settlement Agreement in February 2005
whereby they were able to resolve all claims between them. A true and accurate copy
of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "1 ". (R. 7026 iJ 18) [Now
included as Addendum #5.]
(b) Pioneer and K D A were both represented by counsel throughout the
settlement process that resulted in the preparation and executing of the Settlement
Agreement. (R. 7026 iJ 19).
( c) The property at issue was foreclosed upon by Pioneer at 12 :00 noon on
December 17, 2015. Pioneer Builders acquired the Entire RV Property located in Rich
County, State of Utah, with a bid of $200,000 at the Sheriffs sale. (R.7029 iJ34)
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2.

Additional Relevant Facts as to the Settlement Agreement (Not

admitted - admissibility is an issue on appeal). The following Facts were submitted
in the Declaration of Alison Bodily filed July 26, 2016. Attached as Addendum #2.
cj

Exhibits to that Declaration are Addenda ##3-5. Pioneer did not dispute the facts but
argued that they were inadmissible as they constituted parol evidence as to an
integrated contract. Pioneer Objection to Bodily Declaration filed August 2, 2016.
The trial court sustained Pioneer's legal objection. The facts themselves are not in
dispute, their admissibility is an issue in this appeal. From the Declaration of Alison
Bodily, Addendum #2:
(a) Alison Bodily as President of K DA was familiar with the settlement
negotiations and agreements between K D A and Pioneer - she represented K D A as
its President in those discussions and agreements and signed the Settlement
Agreement. (R. 7243 iJ2)
(b) The initial Proposed Settlement Agreement was prepared by Pioneer and
tendered to K DA for comments. See Addendum #4 (R. 7243 iJiJ3-4).
(c) After reviewing the Proposed Settlement Agreement, K D A was unwilling
to agree to that arrangement because it required a Release of the K D A Trust Deeds
and that would lead to a loss of redemption rights. However, K D A as a part of the
settlement compromise was willing to agree to subordinate those Trust Deeds. Id.
(d) K DA directed its legal counsel to advise Pioneer that it insisted upon
retaining its redemption rights but that it was willing to subordinate. Id. See also,

Memo of Daines & Jenkins dated February 27, 2005, Addendum #4 (R. 7245-7248).

15 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(e) Thereafter, Pioneer modified the Settlement Agreement and it was signed
by me on February 28, 2005. The modifications removed the words "release" and all
the provisions related thereto including deletion of the Release document, Exhibit G,
that was to be recorded (R. 7243-7244) [Compare Addendum #3 with Addendum #5
for the changes referenced.]
(f) The final Settlement Agreement provided that K D A would subordinate
its Trust Deeds but not release them. (R. 7244 il8) See also Settlement Agreement,
[Addendum #5.]

3.

Facts as to the Redemption by K D A. The following Facts were all

presented in K DA 's Amended Motion to Enforce Redemption Right as Facts ##1-11.

~

Pioneer in its Response.filed July 11, 2016 did not object to any of these Facts (R.
7020-7037), hence, they were accepted as per Rule 7(d)(a)(C), URCP.
(a) The Order and Judgment of the Court was that the Property be sold
"subject to any timely and proper exercise of any applicable rights of redemption."

(R. 7009 ,II).
(b) The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale states that the Sheriffs Sale is "subject to
redemption as provided by law." (R. 7009 il2).
(c) K DA CORPORATION on June 14, 2016 exercised its right of
redemption by delivering to Pioneer Builders a Cashier's Check in the amount of

$212,000 and its Exercise of Redemption Rights documents. (R. 7009 if3).
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(d) The Redemption was timely made, within 180 days of the date of the
Sheriffs Sale (12/17/15 - 6/14/16).
(e) The Redemption Payment was properly computed, that being $200,000
plus six percent, for a total of $212,000. (R. 7009 il4).

(t) The Redemption Payment was properly tendered with a Cashier's Check
payable to Pioneer Builders. (R. 70 IO if6).
(g) Pioneer Builders was a creditor and lien holder with first priority against
the Property based upon a recorded First Trust Deed. (R. 70 IO if7).
(h) K D A CORPORATION was a subordinate creditor and lien holder with a
subordinate priority against the Property based upon its Subordination Agreements
with Pioneer and as held in the Order and Judgment dated September 14, 2015. (R.

70 IO if8).
(i) Pioneer Builder's Application for a Writ of Execution filed with the Court

on October 7, 2015, identifies the parties having subordinate interests in the Property
and K D A CORPORATION is at the top of the list of claimants. (R. 70 IO if9).
(j) The Exercise of Redemption Right included "certified copies" by the Rich

County Recorder proving the filing of the lien and assignment of lien to K D A
CORPORATION, as required by Rule 69C. (R. 7010-7011

,r,r 10-11).

(k) The Exercise of Redemption Right included as Exhibit H an Affidavit

showing the amount due on the K DA CORPORATION lien, as required by Rule
4&)

69C. (R. 7011 ifl 1).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The modified Settlement Agreement which was executed by the parties settled
their priority dispute by agreeing that K DA 's trust deed positions would be
subordinate to the first trust deeds of Pioneer. The Settlement Agreement was a
subordination agreement not a release agreement of K D A's second trust deeds.
Pioneer and K D A both signed a new and enhanced 2005 Subordination Agreement
in February of 2005 as a result of the final Settlement Agreement which was recorded
on March 14, 2005. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit E of Addendum #5 (R.66736678) (2005 Subordination Agreements). This 2005 Subordination Agreement
executed in conjunction with the Settlement Agreement identifies the trust deeds of
Pioneer and the trust deeds of K D A and expressly affirms the validity and
effectiveness of all of those trust deeds, however, also agreeing that the K D A trust
deeds and all K D A rights in the property would be subordinate to the Pioneer trust
deeds. Exhibit E, Addendum #5 (R. 6676). The 2005 Subordination Agreement
provided that the "priority of Pioneer's Trust Deeds, and each of them, over KDA's
Trust Deeds, and each of them, shall be respected in the presently pending judicial
foreclosure of Pioneer's Trust Deeds and in any exercise of any power of sale" Id.
Hence, K D A contends that it retained its redemption rights incident to its status as a
remaining "subordinate creditor."
The Settlement Agreement included these terms:

ii. Pioneer is entitled to foreclose upon all of the Rich County Property
... foreclosing out, terminating, and extinguishing any and all estates,
rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of any and all
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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types and natures whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in, on, or to
the Rich County Property ...
Addendum #5, Settlement Agreement, page 8 subsection ii. (R. 7051 ). Based upon
that quoted language in the Settlement Agreement and the Order based thereon, the
trial court concluded that K DA had waived its right to redemption when Pioneer
subsequently foreclosed. In this the trial court erred as the clause is only providing the
standard priority that accrues in every foreclosure sale of a first trust deed, that the
"purchaser or last redemptioner," as per Rule 69C (h), would take the property free of
the subordinate claims of K D A as by this foreclosure process the K D A second trust
deeds would be "foreclosed out, terminating, and extinguishing" K D A's interests
just as provided in the Settlement Agreement. There is nothing in this language that
indicates that K D A's redemption rights in the foreclosure sale are being waived.
Indeed, the clause is operable exactly as written, Pioneer is entitled to foreclose and
the successful bidder or the last redeemer will take title free and clear of all claims of
K D A. The point is that K D A or any subordinate creditor or the debtor is in the
class that can be the purchaser or a redemptioner. By Utah statute the subordinate
creditors such as K D A do have the right to redeem after the foreclosure sale. Rule
69C(b). This contractual language in the Settlement Agreement has no effect
whatsoever on that right. The trial court erred as it misunderstood this standard
language describing the rights between a creditor with priority and a creditor which
has subordinated its lien.
4j
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The trial court also erred in refusing to consider parol evidence from the precontract communications that further substantiated K D A's argument that the
Settlement Agreement was intended to only subordinate and not release the K D A
second trust deed positions.
The foreclosure process is one in equity. Utah foreclosures are considered to be
in the nature of a forfeiture which the law and equity does not favor. Redemption is a
statutory right granted to Utah borrowers and subordinate creditors, "[a]ccordingly the
law provides for the six-month redemption period to give the debtor [and subordinate
creditors] an opportunity" 1 to ameliorate the harshness of the forfeiture implicit in
foreclosures. There is a question whether Utah allows these statutory rights to be
waived by contract between the parties given the public policy and interest in
protecting debtors and avoiding excessive deficiency judgments. Even passing those
arguments, if there is to be a waiver by contract, such an agreement would be required
to meet a high standard showing that it was intentional and fully disclosed between
the parties.

ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION.

The Property at issue is 36 acres of hill side located just west of the Utah State
Marina on Bear Lake. K DA sold the Property subject to both seller financing and
outside financing obtained by the Purchaser. The Purchaser filed bankruptcy leaving

1

United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976) (insertion added).
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Pioneer and K D A both owed significant debt secured by competing trust deeds
against the Bear Lake Property. There were claims between Pioneer and K D A as to
the respective priority of their competing trust deeds; each claimed a first position as
to the same parcels.
A settlement was made between Pioneer and K D A as to the priority of their
trust deeds, consummated in a Settlement Agreement dated February 28, 2005. As a
part of that Settlement Agreement, K D A agreed to entirely subordinate its trust deed
positions recognizing the Pioneer's trust deeds as having a first priority over the trust
deeds of K D A. This was effectuated by Pioneer and K D A entering into a separate
recordable 2005 Subordination Agreement wherein their respective trust deeds were
each listed. It provided that ( 1) Pioneer trust deeds would have a first priority as to all
the Bear Lake Property, (2) the K DA trust deeds would be subordinate to all the
Pioneer trust deeds, (3) that Pioneer's "first priority" was to be respected in the
coming judicial foreclosure of the Bear Lake Property. Addendum #5, Exhibit E,
2005 Subordination Agreement (R. 6673-6677).
Before this foreclosure could occur, Pioneer also had to resolve the priority of
claims by third parties. Those claims were litigated and mostly resolved in favor of
Pioneer's priority but only after appeal. A few of the claimants were given priority
over the Pioneer trust deeds. This process of decision, appeal, remand and final
decision took ten years from the date of the Settlement Agreement between K D A
~

and Pioneer. See, Order and Judgment dated September 4, 2015. (R. 6458). Pioneer
included an order of foreclosure directing the Rich County Sheriff to conduct a
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Sheriff's sale of the Property. The Sheriffs sale was held on December 17, 2015 at
which time, Pioneer made the highest (and only) bid) to purchase the Property for the
sum of $200,000.
On June 14, 2016, K D A served Pioneer Builders with the Exercise of
Redemption (R. 6643-6646) to exercise its redemption right to the Property. Pioneer
responded by rejecting the Redemption of K DA and returning the Cashier's Check.
K D A filed a motion seeking enforcement of its redemption rights to the Property.
Pioneer responded by claiming a number of reasons why K D A's redemption was
improper. However, at argument on the motion, Pioneer conceded as to all of those
objections save one. The one remaining objection was that K D A had waived or
released its redemption rights under the terms and conditions of the Settlement
Agreement and/or its Exhibit E, the 2005 Subordination Agreement. (R. 7615-7616).
The trial court's Amended Judgment and Order denied K D A's motion to
enforce its redemption based upon the trial court's legal detennination that the
Settlement Agreement constituted a waiver of the K DA redemption rights and/or a
release of all redemption rights. Amended Judgement and Order, Addendum# 1
(R.7566-7571). In making this ruling the trial court declined to accept relevant
evidence (an email requiring changes in the Settlement Agreement to preserve K D A
redemption rights) from the interaction between Pioneer and K D A prior to the
execution of the Settlement Agreement. Id. The trial court's reasoning for its refusal
was that it was parol evidence as to an integrated contract that was not ambiguous. Id.
There was no dispute that this relevant evidence was genuine but only that it was
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parol evidence documenting the intentions, interactions and changes to the Settlement
Agreement between the parties prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement.

Amended Judgment and Order, Addendum# 1. (R. 7566-7572).

I.

(;j)

THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT K DA HAD
WAIVED ITS STATUTORY RIGHT OF REDEMPTION BY
ENTERING INTO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
The trial court erred in finding that the Settlement Agreement and its attached

Subordination Agreement and their implementing Order "extinguishes" K D A's right
to redeem the Property from the foreclosure sale. There is no such language in the
Settlement Agreement- it is only an agreement that the K DA Trust Deeds are

clarified in the jointly signed Subordination Agreement. The final Settlement
Agreement is attached as Addendum #5 (R. 7044-7117). The 2005 Subordination
Agreement is attached as Exhibit E of Addendum #5. (R. 6673-6678). There is a
critical difference between the legal effect of a "release" and a "subordination." If the
K D A Trust Deed were "released" there would be no reason for the Subordination
Agreement required of K D A. See Addendum #5, Settlement Agreement at page 11,
paragraphs 9(i),(j) (R.7054). There would also be no need for the assignment of the K
D A Trust Deeds by Summit Escrow Services to K D A. (R. 6694-6701 ).
The language of the Settlement Agreement does provide that Pioneer is
"entitled to foreclose" whereby it will be "foreclosing out, terminating and
extinguishing any and all estates, rights, titles, liens ... of K D A." Settlement

tj
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Agreement, Addendum #5 at page 8 subsection ii (R. 7051 ). However, this
~

"extinguishment" is based upon the future foreclosure of the Property and is the
standard language used to describe what happens to a second priority lien holder.
There is nothing in that language which constitutes a waiver of the second trust deed
holder's right to redemption within the foreclosure process. It is only a statement that
based on priority position, the second priority holder is extinguished upon the
completion of a first priority holder's foreclosure. Rule 69C anticipates that
consequence and grants such subordinate creditors a right to redeem.
The trial court reasoning was that K D A is not a party who may redeem
"because" it has waived its right to do so in the Settlement Agreement. The trial court
found that K D A "at some point in time" was a "creditor having a lien on the
property junior to that on which the property was sold" but that it lost this status
because it agreed "to the extinguishment of its lien" under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement citing this same subsection ii of the Settlement Agreement. The problem
with this reasoning is that the clause cited in the Settlement Agreement makes it clear
that the extinguishment of K D A rights in the Property will be a result of and occur
upon the future foreclosure of the Property, not the execution of the Settlement
Agreement or its implementing Order. The Settlement Agreement and the
implementing Order did not provide that K D A waived or released its rights but that
Pioneer was entitled to foreclose out those K DA "subordinate" rights. Indeed, every
subordinate lien creditor, as a result of the foreclosure process is, as a matter of law,
subject to the same "foreclosing out, terminating and extinguishing of any and all
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estates, rights, titles, liens and encumbrances and other interests" upon completion of
the foreclosure process. That is the very meaning and legal effect of "foreclosure" on
all subordinate claimants.
Qj

Under Pioneer's reasoning adopted by the trial court, all redemptions would be
invalid because the foreclosure sale extinguishes subordinate interests. This is an
incorrect understanding of "foreclosure" as it includes not only the sale but the
redemption process and is only completed upon the issuance of the Sheriffs Deed
after the redemption time has passed. This principle is illustrated in the Court Order
and Judgment because it uses identical language in describing the post foreclosure
rights of all subordinate lien claimants post foreclosure (those which have not entered
into any Settlement Agreement); to wit:

[T]his foreclosure order and judgment shall effect, a foreclosure of
Pioneer's Trust Deeds, and each of them, including foreclosing out,
terminating, and extinguishing any and all interests in, on, and/or to
the Property (and any and every part, parcel, and portion thereof) held
and/or claimed by each, any, and all of the Defendants ...

Order and Judgment, dated September 4, 2015 at page 8, paragraph 8 (R.6465).
(emphasis added). The same language is used repetitively in the Order and Judgment

to the effect that all subordinate creditors will have no rights after the foreclosure
process is finished; to wit:

Any and all estates, rights, titles, liens encumbrances, and/or interest in,
on, and/or to the Property (and all parts, parcels, and portions thereof),
of Defendants herein, and each and any of them, and anyone claiming
by, through, or under each and any of them, are subordinate to

~
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Plaintiffs interests in the Property and are hereby forever barred,
extinguished, and foreclosed, including all of their respective claimed
estates, rights, titles, leases, memberships, trust deeds, liens,
encumbrances, easements, and other interests of any and all types and
natures whatsoever ...

I)

Order and Judgment, dated September 4, 2015 at page 9, paragraph 10 (R. 6466).
(emphasis added)
It is the legal effect of foreclosure that all subordinate rights are cleared and the
purchaser obtains clear title as against subordinate creditors upon completion of the
foreclosure process which process includes the redemption phase post sale. There is
nothing unique about the legal pronouncement in the Settlement Agreement; it does
not constitute a waiver of redemption rights or a release of redemption rights. It is the
language of priority. This is just normal and typical foreclosure language establishing
priorities; it was not a release of redemption rights by K D A and neither was it a
transfer of those K DA redemption rights to Pioneer. That is precisely why the same
wording is used to describe both K D A's legal position and the legal position of all
other subordinate creditors whose rights were subject to the impending foreclosure
process. All of these subordinate creditors (K DA included) are thereby subject to the
priority rights of Pioneer. And all of them by statute retain their redemption rights
unimpaired notwithstanding this priority language as to Pioneer's legal rights.
What Pioneer is claiming here is that by agreeing to be a subordinate lien
creditor, as of the date of the Settlement Agreement, that K D A "released" the K D A
trust deeds. That cannot be. If there were a release, there would be no reason for
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subordination. Also, there would have been no reason for Pioneer to specifically list
QI

K D A as one of "Those known to Plaintiff [Pioneer] who may claim an interest in the
Property." See Pioneer Application for Writ of Execution,filed October 7, 2015, page

6, paragraph 8. Addendum #6. (R. 6515).
Pioneer composed and filed with the Court a list of 48 separate parties who it
specified could make a claim of holding a subordinate interest in the Property and
hence had redemption rights. The Application states that all these claimants were to
have their subordinate rights extinguished by the foreclosure by a priority creditor that is precisely the reason why they are so listed. Id. at pages 6-9. And, K DA c/o its
attorneys had the honor of being the very first party named of the 48 separate parties
listed - all of whom are adjudged that their interests are ')unior, inferior, and
subordinate to the interests of Plaintiff [Pioneer]. Id. at page 9, paragraph 9. (R.
6515) The use of this same language and its repetition in the Order and Judgment to
describe the rights of all of the subordinate creditors, most of whom were not
participants in any Settlement Agreement, makes it clear that it is the foreclosure
process that is extinguishing rights not the Settlement Agreement between Pioneer
andKDA.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of construction used to divine
the meaning of contractual language. Expressing or including one thing [a
subordination] implies the exclusion of the other or the alternative [a release]. The
~

Settlement Agreement with its Subordination Agreement only include the language of
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subordination and include no language or terms incident to a waiver or release of K D
A redemption rights.

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN UETERMINING THAT IT SHOULD NOT
CONSIDER PAROL EVIDENCE FROM THE CONTRACT
FORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TO CLARIFY THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
There were communications between counsel during the negotiation and

drafting of the Settlement Agreement. Pioneer's initial Proposed Settlement
Agreement and its Exhibits, provided to K D A on February 25, 2005, required that
K DA "release" it's Trust Deeds and sign a Release to be recorded which was
attached to the Settlement Agreement as "Exhibit G", titled a "Release and Disclaimer
of All Interest and Claims In or To Real Property." See Addendum #3, Pioneer

Proposed Settlement Agreement and its Exhibit G, Release and Disclaimer ofInterest
in Real Property. (R. 7280-7282) A review of this February 25, 2005, Proposed
Settlement Agreement makes it abundantly clear that Pioneer was proposing to
require K D A to "release" it's Trust Deeds and execute a separate "Release" of the
Trust Deeds to be recorded, concurrent with execution of that Proposed Settlement
Agreement, Addendum #3, pages 6-7 (R. 7254-7256).
K D A responded to the proposed Settlement Agreement on February 2 7, 200 5,
with a Memo emailed to Pioneer's legal counsel. Addendum #4 (R. 7245-7248).
Therein, K DA refused to agree to a "release" stating specifically that KDA would
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only agree to subordinate the Trust Deeds not release them. Id. The Memo provides
G,

in relevant part:

The Settlement Agreement [referring to Pioneer's Proposed
Settlement Agreement of February 25, 2005] generally follows the
terms we have discussed with some modifications necessary to fully
balance the arrangements between both sides. There is a great deal of
unnecessary language which could severely hamper prosecution of the
remaining KDA claims. This needs to be removed. KDA need only
concede to the necessary relief so that you [Pioneer] can proceed to
foreclosure subject to our subordinate Trust Deed.
I have numbered the changes so that we can talk about each one by
reference. The changes discussed are not in order.
2. Special Warranty Deed-Attachments: ... The balance of
that sentence to the effect that KDA interests are made subordinate is
acceptable. It is further suggested that Section 5.e. and its
accompanying Exhibit G be deleted. KDA retains its Trust Deed
and redemption rights. The subordination is adequate to
accomplish all of what Pioneer needs as to this title. Section 7.ii. also
has language about extinguishing all rights which needs to be
modified to allow the redemption rights and subordinate Trust
Deed rights still held by KDA.
7. Release and Disclaimer of All Interests [Exhibit G document]:
This Exhibit appears to suggest that the Trust Deed of KDA is to
be abrogated. There is no reason to do this. The subordination
fully satisfies all of Pioneer and Calls needs in this regard. If you
wish to use this document it should expressly except out of the
release and disclaimer all the rights inherent in a subordinate
trust deed. I think the document is unnecessary.

Memo (emphasis added) Addendum #4 (R. 7245-7248).
This Memo clearly states the objection of K D A to Pioneer's Proposed
Settlement of February 25, 2005 - K D A would not agree to "release" its Trust
Deeds. K DA was only willing to subordinate its Trust Deeds to the Pioneer Trust
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Deeds. And, the reason for that objection was specifically stated - the Settlement
Agreement would need to recognize that "K D A retains its Trust Deed and
redemption rights" and that modifications were needed "to allow the redemption
rights and subordinate Trust Deed rights still held by K D A." Addendum #4, Memo
at page 1-2, last part of numbered paragraph 2 (R. 7245). (emphasis added). And to

that end, K DA required that the Settlement Agreement, Section 5.e. and its
accompanying Exhibit G be deleted. Id.
In response to the Memo there were telephone discussions between counsels.
Pioneer accepted most but not all of the requested changes. The final signed
Settlement Agreement demonstrates that Pioneer did completely accept K D A's core
demand that all the provisions about releasing the K D A Trust Deeds be removed
from the final and signed Settlement Agreement; to wit:
(1) Section 7ii was edited to remove the word "release." This deletion removing
the word "release" restricted this provision to the effect that K D A was only
agreeing to subordinate its Trust Deeds to the Pioneer Trust Deeds.
Compare Addendum #3 [Proposed Settlement Agreement} at page 8
paragraph 7ii (R. 7256) with Addendum #5 [Final Settlement Agreement} at
page 8, paragraph 7ii (R. 7051).

(2) Section 5.e. was deleted. This removed the requirement to execute the
Release which was to be recorded. Compare Addendum #3 [Proposed
Settlement Agreement} at page 7 (R. 7255) with Addendum #5 [Final
Settlement Agreement}at page 7 (R. 7050).
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(3) Section 9.i. was deleted. This deletion removed the obligation to deliver a
recordable Release document. Compare Addendum #3 [Settlement
Agreement} at page 10 (R. 7258) with Addendum #5 [Final Settlement
Agreement}at page 10 (R. 7053).

(4) Exhibit G [Release and Disclaimer of All Interests and Claims In or To Real
Property] was deleted. This change deleted the exhibit to be recorded to
(;jl)

accomplish the release. Compare Addendum #3 [Settlement Agreement} (R.
7280) with Addendum #5 [Final Settlement Agreement}, there is no such
Exhibit to the Final Settlement Agreement.

The facts are clear. Pioneer's initial Proposed Settlement Agreement expressly
included a full release of the K DA Trust Deeds. K DA objected in writing (Memo)
~

demanding that those "release provisions" and Exhibit G be removed from the
Settlement Agreement. Pioneer acceded to the K D A demands by removing the
"release" provisions in the Settlement Agreement and Exhibit G from the final
Settlement Agreement. Only then did both parties execute the final Settlement
Agreement.
Furthermore, the Memo makes it abundantly clear that K DA wanted those
provisions removed specifically so that K D A would retain "redemption rights." As a
result of the Memo, Pioneer was specifically advised in writing that K D A insisted
upon a Settlement Agreement wherein it would retain its "redemption rights." See,
Memo at pages 1-2, Addendum #4. (R. 7245-7246).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
31 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pioneer's argument, accepted by the trial court, some fifteen years later, is that
the remaining text still includes the very release of the Trust Deeds that was removed
from the Proposed Settlement Agreement in the negotiation leading to the final
Settlement Agreement. This argument can only be sustained by a refusal to consider
the relevant evidence proffered to the court to aid its understanding of what the parties
intentions and agreements were. K D A bargained for a Settlement Agreement that
~

gave it the continued right to redeem. Pioneer, in accepting those changes, agreed that
K DA, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, would retain its redemption
rights. Pioneer, with notice, entered into the final Settlement Agreement that expressly
did not include a release but only a subordination of the K DA Trust Deeds. And,
Pioneer was specifically advised that K DA would retain its redemption rights.

A. Exclusion Based On Rule of Evidence 408(2).

Rule 408 (a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits the use of settlement
evidence (conduct or statements) only when it is offered "either to prove or disprove
liability for or the validity or amount of a disputed claim" See, Utah R. Evid. 408(a).
Rule 408(a)(2) is tied to the previous clause (a) limiting the restriction to settlement
discussions about the "disputed claim." In this instance redemption is not a disputed
claim between the parties as that was never part of the dispute between them in the
litigation. Redemption is a statutory right not a "disputed claim." There is no
"disputed claim" relating to redemption rights. This exclusion was in error.
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B. Evidence Exclusion Based on Parol Evidence Rule & Rule of Evidence
408(2).

Pioneer and K D A put before the trial court differing interpretations of the
Settlement Agreement and its attached Subordination Agreement with each side
arguing that its interpretation of the written agreements is more correct than that
proposed by the opposing party. Neither party used the word "ambiguous" in its
arguments or pleadings as neither side would concede that level of credibility to the
other side's interpretation argument. However, the trial court was clearly confronted
with "differing interpretations" which made it necessary for the trial court to consider
the relevant evidence submitted by the Alison Bodily Declaration and its attachments.
The court should note that no argument was made as to the genuine nature of this
relevant evidence, it stands uncontested. This relevant evidence did not vary or add to
the Agreement if K D A's contractual interpretation is accepted. On the other hand,
this evidence directly contradicts the contractual interpretations claimed by Pioneer.
The Memo and the evidence proving the subsequent removal of the "release"
language and the "Release of Trust Deed" from the redrafted Settlement Agreement
diametrically disprove Pioneer's favored interpretation, the one accepted by the trial
court.
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth rules as to the use of parol evidence to
interpret contracts. Ward v. lntermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995).
The principles in that case were reaffirmed and clarified in Daines v. Vincent, 2008
~

UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269 (2008). The Daines case discusses when parol evidence should
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be used to interpret fully integrated contracts. The Ward Rule as further explained by
the Daines case show that in this case the trial court erred in refusing to consider parol
evidence as to the interaction between counsel leading to the modification of the
Settlement Agreement.
Ward sets forth a two-part process for determining whether a contract has a

"facial ambiguity." The first step is that "any relevant evidence must be considered."
Daines at iJ26. A trial court is advised to look not only at the integrated contract but

all relevant evidence to determine if the contract has a facial ambiguity. Id. The
~

second step is that the ')udge must ensure that 'the interpretations contended for
[included within the parol evidence] are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract." Daines at if27 (Citing Ward, 907 P.2d at 268).
Plainly stated, the trial court is directed to consider the relevant evidence
contained in the Bodily Declaration and attachments ("all relevant evidence") in
determining whether there is an "ambiguity'' 2 in the Settlement Agreement. The
question before the trial court and now before this court on appeal is does this
Settlement Agreement language as modified for the reasons stated constitute a release
of redemption rights and/or a waiver of redemption rights by K D A? This "relevant

2

Courts recognize that contracts having formal integration clauses may actually not
be fully integrated as to all issues. See, Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ,r 29, 190 P.3d
1269 (2008) (stating that finding ambiguity is not limited to express contractual terms
but may also be found "where there are missing terms in a contract" (citing Nielsen
v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, iJ 14, 78 P3d 600)) (Emphasis added).
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evidence" is interpretative of the intentions of the parties in excising the "release
language" and the Release of Trust Deed provisions.
Pioneer's argument to the trial court was that upon execution of the Settlement
Agreement, K D A ceased to be a "subordinate creditor" and that its second Trust
Deed was released. K D A's argument to the trial court was that upon execution of the
Settlement Agreement, K D A was confirmed as a "subordinate creditor" and had
rights of redemption, acknowledging that, as a subordinate creditor, upon full
completion of the foreclosure process (including the passage of time allowed for
redemption rights) it would thereupon lose all rights in the real property and the sale
purchaser or the last redemptioner would have title free of all such claims. Neither
party argued the contract was ambiguous as each believed and continues to believe
that their interpretation is correct and the opposing interpretation is incorrect. The
competing interpretations are directly in conflict with each other. Given the dispute
C)

over interpretation, the trial court should have reviewed and considered the relevant
evidence contained in the Alison Bodily Declaration setting forth the interaction and
intentions between the parties in arriving at the final Settlement Agreement.
Specifically, that K D A insisted upon and Pioneer acquiesced to removing the
"release language" and eliminating the "Release of Trust Deed Exhibit" that was
initially requested in the Proposed Settlement Agreement. This was expressly done by
K DA so as to preserve the K DA redemption rights. Upon examining the Bodily
Declaration and its Exhibits, this court should conclude that the absence of a
statement of release or a recorded release of the K D A Trust Deed in the modified
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and final Settlement Agreement was intentional. K D A insisted upon retaining its
(i;>

redemption rights.

The completion of the second step as described in Daines is straightforward;
namely that there is no inconsistency between the K DA interpretation {buttressed
with the parol evidence) and the language of the executed Settlement Agreement.
Conversely, Pioneer's interpretation is expressly rejected by the same analysis
because it is entirely inconsistent with the parol evidence contained in the Bodily
Declaration.

The evidence and documents included in Addenda #2, #3, #4 and #5 (R. 72427248) should have been admitted by the trial court as "relevant evidence" to assist the
trial court in determining the terms of the Settlement Agreement given the conflicting
claims as to its proper interpretation. K DA argues that this parol evidence should not
have been necessary as within the terms of the Settlement Agreement there is a
complete lack of any terms which constitute a waiver or release of redemption rights.
But inasmuch as the trial court is disposed to determine otherwise, it should admit this
relevant evidence to provide it additional information as to the intent of the parties
and the formation of the Settlement Agreement which establishes further that K D A
did not enter into a Settlement Agreement which waived or released its redemption
rights. It did just the opposite, it insisted upon the removal of provisions which would
have released its redemption rights and required Pioneer to remove any obstacles to
its right to redeem this Bear Lake Property upon Pioneer's future foreclosure.
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III.

THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE UTAH STATUTORY
RIGHT TO REDEEM CANNOT BE WAIVED BY DEBTORS OR
SUBORDINATE CREDITORS.

The Utah right to redeem is a statutory right included as a restriction or
limitation on the statutory right to foreclose mortgages. The Utah Supreme Court has
noted that "foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture, which the law does not favor."

United States v. Loosley, 551 P .2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976). Utah mortgage foreclosure
is limited by the imposition, by statute, of a six-month redemption right given to the
debtor and all subordinate creditors. The justification for such a limitation or
restriction comes from a legislative determination that is designed to balance
economic interests between creditors and debtors. In the mortgage foreclosure process
the bid amount also determines the deficiency amount. Any excess of the debt amount
above the foreclosure bid becomes a deficiency judgment amount against the debtor.
By allowing a redemption right, the creditor must take the possibility of a subsequent
redemption into consideration in choosing a bid amount. If the creditor bids below
market value for the property the debtor can redeem and/or transfer his redemption
right to anyone for consideration. Subsequent creditors can also redeem. Thus, the
foreclosing creditor bidding at a foreclosure sale runs the risk of losing the property if
the bid is below fair market value for the property being foreclosed. If redemption
rights are waived, this important limitation is removed. Trust deed sales are not
subject to a redemption right but they have a different anti-deficiency limitation. In
those sales, the right to a deficiency amount, by Utah law, is limited to the amount
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owed in excess of the "the fair market value of the property at the date of sale"
(j;;

irrespective of the amount bid at the trustee's sale. See Utah Code Ann§ 57-1-32.
This requires a specific finding by the court of the property fair market value prior to
the entering of a deficiency judgment based on a trustee's sale. Id.
Thus, both routes available to Utah creditors to foreclose a debtor's property
have statutory restrictions designed to protect debtors from excess deficiency
judgment amounts arising from below fair market bids at foreclosure sales. The
methodology of protection is different for the two routes but the purpose and reason
for the restriction is the same. Absent, these protections, creditors would be free to
engage in foreclosure bids at less than fair market value with little risk. The court
should note that in this matter, the foreclosure sale of this Bear Lake Property was
timed to occur eight days before Christmas (the winter and holiday season) in
Randolph, Utah. Advertising was limited to that required by statute. There is no
evidence that Pioneer made any effort whatsoever to advertise or seek prospective
buyers to attend the sale. The sale was attended by only one prospective buyer,
Pioneer, the foreclosing creditor. 3 Absent redemption rights there are no controls to
encourage the bidder at such a sale to bid a fair market price. Indeed, the significant
resistance of Pioneer to this redemption may be an admi~sion by conduct that
Pioneer's did purchase the property at less than fair market value. That is certainly the
assessment of K D A in exercising its redemption right.

3

K D A's attorney was present but upon the inquiry of Pioneer indicated to Pioneer that he
did not intend to place a bid at the sale.
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The question for this court and the State of Utah is whether the statutory
redemption right is something that should be subject to waiver. If it is, then the
standard mortgages and trust deeds being signed hundreds of times each day in this
State could simply have that added as one more element an already daunting number
of pages of small type denominating creditor rights in current Utah trust deeds. There
is nothing to distinguish the waiver that Pioneer seeks to impose upon K D A, from a
waiver that is included as a standard part of every new trust deed and mortgage. Or an
arrangement forced on every defaulting borrower seeking an extension of time. If it is
determined by this court that creditors can seek and include waivers in their
arrangements with debtors their use will begin. That will be the practical end of the
Utah statute granting redemption rights and thereby controlling and limiting
deficiency judgments against debtors.
What Pioneer seeks, is a court ruling that it is permissible and enforceable to
enter into agreements with subordinate creditors (and debtors) that waive the statutory
redemption rights set forth in Rule 69C. K D A would urge the court not to set such a
precedent, but to set a precedent that such waivers are not permitted and will not be
enforced. The court should uphold the right of the State to control this property right;
that creditors are not free to obtain waivers of statutory protections for debtors and
~

subordinate creditors. If the court doesn't want that broad a policy then at a minimum
it should determinate that such waivers are to be viewed with disfavor and subject to
strict judicial scrutiny and limited to those cases where the waiver is clearly agreed to
and specifically states clearly that all redemption rights are waived. It should be noted
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that in making this broad policy argument, K D A continues to argue that it did not
agree to waive its redemption rights in the Settlement Agreement as written.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the rights of redemption
provided for under state laws in place when a trust deed or mortgage is given and
found them to be a "rule of property" determined by each state and enforceable in
federal courts. Such a statutory provision constitutes "a rule of property" as to each
state which provides redemption rights. Brine v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 96 US 627
24 L.Ed. 858 (1877); Swift v. Smith, 102 US 442, 450-51, 26 L.Ed. 193 (1880). States
which have considered the issue have determined that the statutory right of
redemption exists even when the decree of foreclosure does not provide for
redemption rights. Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New Miami Shores Corp., 100 Fla 413, 129
So 690 (1930); Illinois Nat'! Bank v. Gwinn, 390 Ill 345; 61 NE2d 249 (1945). The
treatise American Jurisprudence states that:
When a right to redeem from a foreclosure sale has been granted by
statute, it constitutes a rule of property in the state, and cannot be
extinguished except by due process of law.
The statutory right to redeem from a mortgage foreclosure sale is
entirely independent of the decree. No action of the court is necessary to
confer it on parties entitled, and no action of the court can take it away.
55 Am Jur Mortgages, Section 876 (citations omitted). The treatise also notes that
redemption rights should be liberally construed.
Statutes giving a right to redeem after foreclosure and sale are
remedial in their nature, and are intended not only for the benefit of
creditors holding liens subsequent to a lien in process of foreclosure, but
more particularly for the purposes of making the property of the debtor
pay as many of his debts as it can be made to pay, and of preventing its
sacrifice, and should be liberally construed.
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Id., Section 879 (citations omitted).
Utah courts have not yet ruled on the legal issue of whether the Utah statutory
right of redemption can be eliminated between creditors and debtors by contract
provision in mortgages, trust deeds or other written instruments. Utah courts have
approved of the right to transfer the right of redemption to an assignee for
consideration. Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, 32 P.2d 990. Downey

State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978); Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 268, 311 P2d 882, modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P .2d 791
( 1957). It has also been held that a bankruptcy trustee abandonment of all interest in a
property includes an abandonment of redemption rights. Tech-Fluid Servs. Inc. v.
Gt

Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 795 P2d 1138
(Utah 1990). None of these cases are dispositive of whether private parties in Utah
can by written instrument waive statutory redemption rights given to debtors and
subordinate creditors.
The trial court's Amended Judgement and Order includes at its pages 6-7 a
discussion of law regarding redemption rights. The only Utah case cited is Chapman

v. Schiller, 83 P.2d 249,254 (Utah 1938). The trial court quotes two phrases from the
opinion of Judge Larson without noting that these are taken from a concurring opinion
and that the two phrases that are taken out of context and significantly separated by
other language. The Opinion of the Court in Chapman was joined in by three justices,
Gil)

Judge Larson wrote a concurring opinion and Judge Moffat wrote a dissent. Even
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these two quoted phrases from the Larson concurring opinion are taken out of context,
with the context added they support K D A's position; to wit:
The right of redemption is one given by the law and not by contract of the
parties. Courts generally hold that a waiver of the right of redemption, inserted
in a mortgage, is void and unenforceable. Brine v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 96
U.S. 627, 24 L.Ed. 858; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 24 L.Ed. 775; Dennis v.
Kelley, 81 Okla. 155, 197 P. 442; Tracy on Corporate Foreclosures, Sec. 217
Neither can an owner by his voluntary act create a right of redemption in
another. The owner or lienor having such right may sell or assign the same to
another but he cannot create such right by any act of his own. And unless he is
one in whom the law has created such right he cannot sell or create it. It is a
right which the statute gives to the limited class it seeks to favor and protect
and which it withholds from all others. It does not, it cannot, exist by virtue of
contract; it is not founded on contract, and interference with it or its denial or
abrogation is not impairing any contractual rights or privileges. The lawmakers
may at any time change, enlarge, diminish, or deny it altogether and no one can
cay [Sp - "say to"] them "Nay" or be heard to complain.

Chapman at 254 (trial court quotation is that underlined with a "but" inserted between
the two separated phrases). The Chapman case was not about a foreclosure sale but
had to do with a sale of real property by a court appointed receiver, thus a receiver's
sale. The Opinion of the Court was that such a sale was not required to be completed
under the requirements of the mortgage foreclosure statute; as it found that the court's
power in reference to receiverships contained the power to sell independently of the
foreclosure statute. Chapman at 253. The trial court's citation to this case does not
support its _decision or the line of cases cited from other states, rather the concurring
opinion cited is supportive of the K D A position that the foreclosure statute
provisions involving redemption cannot be waived by contract. However, K DA
acknowledges that redemption rights can be assigned and they could be released by a
release of a lien against the property, i.e. a reconveyance of a second trust deed. Such
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assignment of redemption rights or releases of all interests cancelling redemption
rights are entirely consistent with the Utah redemption rights statute.
The trial court followed up its Chapman citation with a number of cases from
other jurisdictions as to waiver of redemption rights. There is such a line of cases
holding that statutory redemption rights can be waived however these cases uniformly
hold that even in considering such waivers that;
[A]ny contract by which the mortgagor sells or conveys his interest to the
mortgagee is viewed suspiciously and is carefully scrutinized by an equity
court. The exchange must be fair, frank, honest, and without fraud,
misconduct, undue influence, oppression or unconscionable advantage of the
poverty, distress or fears of the mortgagor.
Russo v. Wolpers, 116 Mich. App 327,338; 323 N.W.2d 385 (1982). However, there
is also a line of cases wherein it is held that statutory redemption rights cannot be
waived4 or can be waived only on certain terms and events. 5
Herein, the executed Settlement Agreement includes no "waiver" of
redemption rights, instead it has an agreement that K DA shall subrogate its second
trust deed and the negotiations to that end show that the clause requiring a
reconveyance and a release of redemption rights was removed. The facts of this case
"carefully scrutinized" show just the opposite to what is discussed in the Russo case;
K DA bargained for and obtained the position of a subordinate creditor with statutory
redemption rights. Even in those jurisdictions that allow waiver of statutory

4

Quinn Plumbing Co. v. New Miami Shores Corp., 100 Fla 413, 129 So 690; Illinois Nat 'I Bank v. Gwinn, 390
Ill 345, 61 NE2d 249.
5 Omaha Bank for Cooperatives v. Sioux-land Cattle Cooperative, 305 NW2d 458 (Iowa); First Trust Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Armstrong, 222 Iowa 425,269 NW 502; Gordon v. Lee, 102 Ind 125, 1 NE 290 (1885).

~
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redemption rights the waiver of statutory rights must be clear and unmistakable. There
is no such waiver here - the words "waive" do not appear; nor is there any reference
to redemption rights being given up.
The trial court erroneously found the words of "waiver" in the Settlement
Agreement wherein it states that foreclosure would "extinguish any and all estates,
rights, titles, liens, encumbrances, and other interests of any and all types of nature
whatsoever that KDA may have or claim in [the Property]." Settlement Agreement at
page 8, Section 7(a)(ii), Addendum #5. (R. 7051 ). This same language appears as to
not only K D A but also as to all the other subordinate creditors in the Order for
foreclosure. (R. 6466 if I 0). That is because it is the standard language of foreclosure
rights that upon foreclosure all such property rights are gone for subordinate creditors
and the debtor. But the language must be interpreted by a full understanding of what
the word "foreclosure" encompasses. The trial court treats that word as though it only
refers to the Sheriffs sale and that the issuance of the certificate of sale after that sale
is the completion of "foreclosure." That understanding of the word "foreclosure" is
simply wrong. The word "foreclosure" refers to the entire statutory process including

~

the Sheriffs sale, issuance of the certificate of sale and all the way through the
redemption process with "foreclosure" only being completed upon the issuance of the
Sheriffs Deed; to wit: "The purchaser or last redemptioner is entitled to conveyance
upon the expiration of the time permitted for redemption." Utah R. Civ. P. 69C.
Foreclosure includes the redemption time and the redemption process. Hence, the
language of the Settlement Agreement and of the Order, etc., all use the term of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"foreclosure" as including the time period and process of redemption. When the
words "upon foreclosure" are used it means after all the steps in the foreclosure
process are completed - which is when the Sheriffs Deed is finally issued to the
purchaser or last redemptioner. Such language does not remove redemption rights but
reaffirms their existence within that process. The trial court misunderstood what the
word "foreclosure" includes.
It is admitted that the right to redeem may be lost by parting with all interest in
the property. For example, a second tiust deed holder does not retain a right of
~

redemption if the second trust deed is reconveyed or released. In the instant matter,
the initial Settlement Agreement proposed by Pioneer to K DA included a
requirement that K D A release its second trust deed. Had K D A accepted that
provision, it would have lost all redemption rights. But such a release and
reconveyance is wholly different than a "waiver" of redemption rights such as Pioneer
claims occurred here by K D A agreeing to a subordination. The very act of K D A in
refusing to release and reconvey while acquiescing to a subordination arrangement

~

makes it clear what both Pioneer and K DA agreed to in their final Settlement
Agreement was that K D A would retain its statutory redemption rights as a
subordinate creditor. And, that is further memorialized in the foreclosure orders
denominating K DA as a subordinate creditor and stating that Pioneer's purchase was
subject to redemption rights.
K DA urges the court to detennine that the Utah statutory provisions
providing debtors and subordinate creditors with redemption rights in mortgage
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foreclosure proceedings cannot be waived by private contract. Specifically, as applied
in this matter, that were the parties to purport to waive redemption rights by written
agreement, such waiver ought to be void as a matter of public policy under the
statutory provisions of the State of Utah. The court should preserve this protection.
Absent such protection, the superior position of creditors will enable them to impose
the waiver of redemption rights in all of their standard, preprinted deeds of trust and
mortgages. For all practical purposes then the right of redemption will cease to be the
established right of Utah debtors and creditors. Foreclosing creditors will be unlimited
in mortgage foreclosure sales to bid however low they can, given the loss of
redemption rights, and thereby maximize deficiency judgement amounts. The
protection provided by Utah should be judicially recognized as not being subject to
waiver by contract, mortgage or trust deed. The court is urged to protect Utah
redemption rights.

IV.

THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS MATTER SHOULD BE
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS BASED UPON THE
TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
~

The terms of the Settlement Agreement provide that in the event of a dispute,
that the prevailing party shall be awarded attorney's fees and costs. In the lower court,
Pioneer was awarded attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party. K D A did not
dispute that the prevailing party is entitled to such an award. Additionally, it did not
contest the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Pioneer. K D A reserved its
right to claim that it would eventually be found to be the prevailing party upon this
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appeal and as a part thereof, would seek a legal determination on appeal denying
~

attorney's fees and costs to Pioneer and, conversely that K DA be awarded attorneys
fees and costs as the prevailing party. That is the basis on which this issue should be
resolved on appeal. Once the appeal is fully resolved, the court should additionally
determine which party is the prevailing party in this matter and sustain and/or award
attorney's fees and costs based upon appropriate proof of the same in the trial court.

CONCLUSION
K D A entered into a Settlement Agreement with Pioneer whereby it
compromised its claims as to priority in return for consideration agreeing to accept the
position of subordination to the Pioneer Trust Deeds. The parties included the
standard language used in such subordinations agreeing that "upon foreclosure" the
rights of K D A as a subordinate creditor would be extinguished, terminated, released,
etc. The trial court has misinterpreted that contractual language in finding that it
constituted a release and waiver of the subordinate Trust Deed right of redemption.
That is a legal error that should be corrected by the appellate court.
In addition, to the language of the Settlement Agreement itself, there is
Gs)

additional ~vidence in the negotiations between the parties that the agreement was one
of subordination rather than release. During the settlement negotiations prior to the
execution of that Settlement Agreement Pioneer proposed that K DA execute a
release as opposed to a subordination of its Trust Deed position. K D A refused,
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specifically advising Pioneer that it would subordinate but it would not release its
Trust Deed. The final Settlement Agreement is a modification of the proposed
Settlement Agreement evidencing that the release language and the Release of the
Trust Deed were removed from the final and executed Settlement Agreement. The

41v

trial court erred in failing to consider this "relevant evidence" as a part of its
interpretative determination.

RELIEF REQUESTED
The court should reverse the Order of the lower court remanding the case to the
lower court with direction that K DA is entitled to a new Order enforcing its right of
redemption to the Property exactly as proposed in its original motion to the lower
court ~ith attorney's fees and costs awarded to K DA as the prevailing party with the
amount to be determined by the lower court.
Additionally, the court should enter its judgment that the Utah statutory right
of redemption is not subject to waiver by debtors or subordinate creditors; that it is a
part of the Utah process for foreclosure and will be protected as such.
DATED October 10, 2017.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
DAINES & JENKINS
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